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Endogenous Infrastructure Development and
Spatial Takeoff in the First Industrial Revolution
By Alex Trew∗
This paper develops a model in which the evolution of the transport
sector occurs alongside the growth in trade and output of agricul-
tural and manufacturing firms. Simulation output captures aspects
of the historical record of England and Wales over 1710–1881. A
number of counterfactuals demonstrate the role that the timing and
spatial distribution of infrastructure development plays in deter-
mining the timing of takeoff. There can be a role for policy in
accelerating takeoff through improving infrastructure, but the spa-
tial distribution of that improvement matters.
JEL: H54; N13; N93; O11; O18; O33; R12.
Keywords: Industrial revolution, growth, transport, spatial devel-
opment.
This paper studies infrastructure development in the context of a growth model
where trade occurs across a continuum of space (after Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg,
2014) and where the costs of trading across that space are a function of the en-
dogenous supply of infrastructure at each location. By explicitly modelling the
geography and the endogenous determination of trade costs, we can capture the
bi-directional interaction between the evolution of trade costs and the location,
concentration and growth of firms in different sectors. Such interaction can hap-
pen via two channels. First, the growth of employment in transport and distribu-
tion services can be a response to the growth of, and the spatial concentration in,
the agricultural and industrial sectors. Second, the demand for new infrastructure
investment can emerge in different locations as some regions become wealthy or
as industrial hotspots emerge far from large markets for first-geography reasons.
In turn, the employment of labour in transport services means less labour is avail-
able for industry and agriculture; this may lower firm scale and delay the onset
of investment in innovation. Further, the lower transport costs that follow in-
frastructure improvements stimulate further changes to the economic geography.
With the model in hand, we match quantitative aspects of the macroeconomic
and spatial history of England and Wales over the period of the industrial revo-
lution, from 1710 to 1881. We then use counterfactual treatments of the model
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to consider the dynamic impact on growth of policies that change the timing and
spatial distribution of infrastructural development.
Investment in transport infrastructure is often central to efforts at stimulating
development in low-income countries (World Bank, 2015). We know that sig-
nificant change in economic geography is a feature of development (Desmet and
Henderson, 2015) and that falling transport costs have an impact on economic
activity (Redding and Turner, 2015). We have only a limited understanding, how-
ever, of how transport costs, economic geography and economic growth interact
in an economy going through a transition to high growth. How does the quantity
of labour employed in the tertiary sector, the quantity of infrastructure invest-
ment, its timing relative to transition to high growth, and its geographical focus,
affect long-run macroeconomic outcomes such as structural transformation and
the emergence of sustained high growth? The answers to these questions should
inform policies directed toward infrastructure.
Modern infrastructure investment, even if financed in partnership with the pri-
vate sector, is generally organized and planned by the State. The experience of
England and Wales during the industrial revolution, in contrast, was of infras-
tructure development that was largely driven locally by private enterprise. The
industrial revolution was accompanied by a revolution in transport infrastructure
that occupied an increasing proportion of the workforce and that vastly reduced
the cost and increased the speed of transporting goods (Bogart, 2014). That
transport revolution was a response to, and stimulant of, the reshaping of the
economic geography of England and Wales which occurred during the 18th and
19th centuries. England and Wales thus provides a useful benchmark environ-
ment in which we can understand the development of transport infrastructure
in a laissez faire economy. With a model of that infrastructure development in
hand, we can conduct counterfactual analysis to explore the consequences of an
alternative infrastructure policy, such as ones similar to those seen today. While
we may be hesitant to compare early industrial England and Wales to the modern
world, there are Continental European examples in this historical period where
centralized infrastructure policy significantly affected the timing and spatial dis-
tribution of transport developments (Smith, 1990). Among others, Szostak (1991)
has made the case that those policies also delayed growth. Although there are
significant differences today, such as the rise of commuting, modern infrastruc-
ture is subject to many of the same underlying changes in demand that emerge
endogenously as spatial economic change occurs. By studying whether historical
policies that centralise infrastructure development had real consequences, we can
thus begin to learn about how infrastructure policy and growth are fundamentally
related.
We develop a model that captures the evolution of the transport sector in
England and Wales over the period 1710–1881. To do so, we introduce endoge-
nous transportation costs to the framework of spatial development in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2014). In particular, we make the cost of transporting goods
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through a location endogenous to the supply of infrastructure at that location.
Infrastructure supply is part stock of fixed infrastructure and part transporta-
tion service produced by local carriers. Landowner-carriers1 hire transportation
labour to facilitate the wholesaling and distribution of goods through their land.
Landowners may also lease land to infrastructure companies who improve the
infrastructure on their land. As in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014), firms
can invest in developing improved production methods at a location and, as in
Trew (2014), non-homothetic preferences mean that consumption shifts toward
manufactured goods as incomes grow. The evolution of the transport sector oc-
curs simultaneously with those firm decisions that drive the aggregate takeoff in
growth rates and the structural transformation of the economy.
We initialize the model using data for the occupational structure of England
and Wales at 1710. We then run the model for 171 periods and track its pre-
dictions against various macroeconomic variables, such as average growth rate
and overall structural transformation, as well as against the spatial distribution
of employment in each sector, the endogenous decline in transport costs and the
spatial distribution of infrastructure improvements. An industrial takeoff in the
North of England, and the specialization of the South in agriculture, means that a
greater quantity of output is traded over greater average distances. The demand
for transportation improvements emerges locally as a response to the demand
for inter-regional trade. Since transport costs also affect the scale of production,
incentives to innovate and the emergence of agglomerations, there is a feedback
from that infrastructural development to the speed of the takeoff in growth.
By modelling infrastructural development as an endogenous process, and by
matching that model to the historical experience during the industrial revolution,
we can ask how policies which depart from the experience in England and Wales
may have affected the timing and speed of takeoff. We find that the timing and
spatial distribution of infrastructure improvements can matter. In particular,
we show that exogenously higher transport costs can bring forward the date of
takeoff as it increases the agglomeration forces that make it more likely firms
overcome the fixed costs of innovation. However, early infrastructure investment
can accelerate industrial takeoff since it also releases labour out of providing
transportation services. Large gains from early infrastructure are only realized
if the infrastructure investment is focused on those locations that have a local
demand for it. If an equivalent infrastructure improvement is implemented in a
spatially-uniform way, the impact on the timing of takeoff is severely muted.
A. Related Literature
The paper builds on a number of different strands in the literature. First, we
relate to the literature on urban economics, development and the impact of trade
1While agents in the model own a diversified portfolio of all land, we refer to ‘local landowners’ as
agents in each location who manage the local land and receive a share of the total rent.
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costs. Desmet and Henderson (2015) surveys the literature on the relationship
between economic development and the changing geographical organization of
economic activity. As they show, one particular avenue for research is in modelling
the interplay between macroeconomic outcomes, such as growth, and the spatial
distribution of economic activity. For this paper, technological progress occurs as
firms attain scale in cities; those agglomerations are themselves a function of a
transportation network that evolves as the economy grows. While there is a recent
literature2 that makes endogenous the costs of transportation, or the transport
network itself, these are limited to static models and, mostly, a discrete number
of large spatial units. Here, we study trade across a continuum of space and
adopt the spatial development framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014).
A further contribution is in understanding the role of transport costs on economic
activity. Redding and Turner (2015) surveys the literature that looks to identify
the consequences of exogenous variations in infrastructure supply on the spatial
distribution of economic activity. These include structural approaches such as
Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Donaldson (2018). Those papers incorporate the
general equilibrium effect of improving market access in one location on activity
in other locations. Such models tend, again, to be static and typically only model
one sector (agriculture). Nagy (2015) models spatial development over time in
two sectors and obtains results on the impact of infrastructure on growth. Here
we model structural transformation and evolution of infrastructure as it occurs
over one-dimensional space and time. Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) studies the
optimal design of infrastructure networks, but in a static model.
Second, the paper relates to the literature on growth, structural transformation
and transport costs. As shown in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), one way to
generate endogenous growth is to model firms that innovate based on it being
tied the use of land as an excludable factor of production. This paper uses
that framework and extends Trew (2014) to incorporate labour employed in the
transport sector. It thus contributes to the literature on structural transformation
(see Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2014). A number of papers, such as
Adamopoulos (2011), Herrendorf, Schmitz and Teixeira (2012) and Gollin and
Rogerson (2014), show how exogenous transport costs affect labour allocations in
a static setup with exogenous growth. For this paper, transport costs and growth
evolve endogenously over time.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the industrial revolution. Shaw-Taylor
and Wrigley (2014) have recently shown that the truly dynamic part of the econ-
omy over the course of the 19th century, the period in which per capita growth
took off (Crafts and Harley, 1992), was the tertiary sector. A large portion of that
tertiary sector growth constituted a transport revolution that was projected by
largely private enterprise which faced a need to reduce the costs of inter-regional
trade (Bogart, 2014). Szostak (1991) is among those that have made a case for
the importance of transportation Britain’s early industrial lead over France. Re-
2See, for example, Kleinert and Spies (2011), Asturias and Petty (2013) and Swisher (2015).
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cent work by Desmet, Greif and Parente (2015) investigates how lower transport
costs increased spatial competition, reduced the power of guilds and led to indus-
trialization. This paper contributes to that debate by simultaneously modelling
the role of transportation services and growth. By conducting counterfactual ex-
ercises, we can ask whether industrial takeoff may indeed have been delayed as a
result of different transport policies.
B. Outline
In Section I we briefly discuss England and Wales during the industrial revo-
lution as well as evidence on the nature of the transport revolution during that
time. We develop the full model of endogenous infrastructure in two steps. First,
in Section II we make labour in transport and distribution endogenous to output
and trade across space but keep the infrastructure stock fixed. In Section III we
present simulation results which demonstrate that this model can match the ag-
gregate and spatial development of England and Wales over the period 1710–1881.
Second, in Section IV we extend the model to allow endogenous investments in
infrastructure stock, comparing the model to the data for England and Wales in
Section V. Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
I. Occupational change, growth and transportation in England and Wales,
1710–1881
We focus on the industrial revolution in England and Wales for two main rea-
sons. First, infrastructure development in England and Wales during the 18th and
19th centuries was relatively decentralized (see Trew, 2010). Today, infrastruc-
ture projects are carefully planned by central governments (even where financed
privately). For 18th and 19th century England and Wales, infrastructure devel-
opment was characterized by local projection (i.e., not organized into a national
system) and local finance. While the contrast to modern policies is clear, we
can, as discussed below, draw a more direct historical contrast in the policies to-
ward infrastructure between Britain and France. Second, we have exceptionally
detailed data at high spatial resolution for England and Wales over the period
when it was the first nation to enter a sustained period of high growth and the
scene of the most rapid revolution in the speed and cost of transportation to that
date. This data permits an understanding of the changing economic geography
and spatial takeoff that underpinned the industrial revolution. We can thus ask
whether and how the development of infrastructure interacted with the spatial
takeoff.
A. Occupational structure and growth
For occupational information we use the data described in Shaw-Taylor et al.
(2010b) at three dates: 1710, 1817 and 1881. The data is observed at the level of
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624 registrations districts covering nearly all of England and Wales. For 1881, the
available census records provide a complete picture of the local occupational struc-
ture. For 1817, there was no such occupational census. Shaw-Taylor et al. de-
scribe the process of constructing a ‘quasi-census’ based on information in parish
baptismal records. The data for 1710 uses the observations of baptismal records
in 1,062 of the 11,102 ancient parishes in England at that time. Trew (2014) uses
this sample to construct predicted values for the number of adult males in each
major occupation (primary, secondary, tertiary and textiles) at the level of the
registration district.
Occupations are categorised using the Wrigley (2010) Primary-Secondary-Tertiary
(PST) system. Primary occupations are mainly agriculture but also forestry, fish-
eries and mining (the latter of which we remove).3 Secondary occupations are
manufacturing, processing and construction. The tertiary sector is composed of
four groups: Transportation and communication; sellers; dealers; and profession-
als. The distributive sector (i.e., the tertiary sector less professions) makes up
over half the total tertiary employment through the period of study. We use the
tertiary sector without professionals.4 Figure 1 depicts the aggregate structural
transformation at the PST level, with professions and mining omitted, alongside
the trend in per capita growth of output over the same period from Mokyr (2004).
Figure 1 captures the surprising aspect of the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) find-
ings (see also Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley, 2014). The secondary sector is stable and
growing over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, from 45 percent in 1710
to 48 percent in 1817 and finally 58 percent in 1881.5 The decline in the primary
sector starting early in the 18th century accelerates after 1817 but this is not
reflected entirely by a growth in the relative importance of industry. Instead, the
decline in agriculture is accompanied by the rapid growth of the tertiary sector.
Most strikingly, the accelerated shift of labour out of the primary sector and the
rapid increase in the tertiary sector is coincident with the takeoff in per capita
growth. At a macroeconomic level, this suggests that there is something missing
in the typical understanding of growth as simply a result of a shift of resources
from agriculture to industry alone. One way of understanding this is bound up
in space, as Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) conjecture:
It may be that the majority of tertiary growth in the 19th century
was required simply to move the greatly increased output of primary
and secondary goods longer average distances around the country. If
this is the case then the rise of the tertiary sector was caused, at least
in part, by the marked expansion in the productivity of other sectors
and in that sense heralds the onset of modern economic growth.
3In the Wrigley classification, the Primary sector includes mining. We remove mining since it behaves
quite differently from agriculture in terms of the aggregate trend and the spatial sorting behaviour. When
we refer to primary in this paper, we mean primary less mining.
4The trend for tertiary including professions and services over the 19th century is much like that shown
in Figure 1. When we refer to tertiary employment in this paper, we mean tertiary less professionals.
5These are shares of employment with mining excluded and with professions removed from tertiary.
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Figure 1. Occupational structure and growth
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a), p.21.
That is, tertiary employment growth can be a function of changes in the size
and spatial concentration of the primary and secondary sectors.
B. The spatial transformation
Economic activity is unevenly distributed across space and that unevenness can
change over time and in different ways in different sectors. This is a form of spatial
structural transformation. If each sector changed uniformly at all points in space,
or if each sector each grew only at one point in space, then the complexity added
by modelling that space is not necessarily important for developing a model of
what drives growth.
Since we have information at the level of the registration district, we can con-
sider whether there was such a spatial structural transformation. Figures 2–4
use the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) data to map the registration district shares of
adult male employment in primary, secondary and tertiary occupations, respec-
tively (colors represent share levels6). The primary sector becomes more spatially
specialized in the South and East of England. The spatial distribution of the sec-
ondary sector is relatively stable over the period. The small industrial hotspots
6The histograms at the North-West of each panel are the count of registration districts (y-axis)
against the registration district share in that sector (x-axis).
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are visible in the North and Midlands; these become slightly larger over the pe-
riod. As will be seen below, a significant characteristic of change in the secondary
sector results from movement of population to the industrial regions. Since, in
local terms, those regions at the heart of the industrial revolution were already
highly industrialized at 1710, Figure 3 masks this important feature of spatial
change. The most striking change is that shown in Figure 4. In particular, there
is little clear change to the spatial distribution of tertiary employment. Most
areas outside the London area have less than 10 percent of workers employed
in the tertiary sector at 1710. By 1881, no registration district has less than 5
percent employed and the modal share is in the 10-15 percent range. The growth
in the local importance of the tertiary sector occurs uniformly across all areas of
the country, whether they were initially agricultural or industrial. The growth
in shares of tertiary employment thus means that in absolute terms, tertiary
employment grows along with the growth in employment in other sectors.
The spatial structural transformation in England and Wales over the period
1710 thus takes the form of a primary sector that declines in the North and
grows in the South, a secondary sector that maintains its Northern hotspot and a
tertiary sector that grows in relative importance at most points in space. A model
of this spatial detail, and of how different sectors change spatially over time, could
be necessary to understand the drivers of takeoff in the first Industrial Revolution.
C. The transport revolution
Alongside the changes to the number of workers employed in the tertiary sec-
tor is significant investment in infrastructure capital and declines in the costs of
transportation. The nature of the transport revolution in Britain is discussed in
Bagwell (1974) and the excellent survey in Bogart (2014). For Bagwell (p.15),
“It was the rapidly increasing volume of inter-regional exchange that made im-
perative the introduction of more sophisticated forms of goods transport.” Those
improvements took the form of new technologies such as better paving and river
improvements, as well as better modes of transport. For the purposes of this
paper, we treat the improvements within a mode and across modes of transport
as one continual improvement in transport infrastructure.
The principal means of improving inland transportation in the early 18th cen-
tury was the introduction of privately managed roads in the form of turnpike
trusts. These trusts, while not profit-making, were permitted by Act of Parlia-
ment to charge tolls for passage along the road. As Buchanan (1986) and Bogart
(2007) describe, the trusts were run by those local to the infrastructure; they were
often formed in response to local demand. A distinction is also apparent between
the role of the funds raised for the initial turnpike improvement and the levying
of tolls for subsequent current spending on maintenance.7
7As Buchanan (1986, p.228) notes, the Acts of Parliament allowed the “raising of funds in a financial
market and the levying of tolls on road users... in general the former provided the long-term capital of
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Figure 2. Primary Employment Shares, 1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Source: Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a)
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Figure 3. Secondary Employment Shares, 1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Source: Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a)
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Figure 4. Tertiary Employment Shares, 1710 (l) and 1881 (r)
Source: Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a)
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The second major mode of transport took the form of extending navigable rivers
and the construction of canals, particularly from the early 19th century on. For
canals, Parliament authorized the formation of joint-stock companies that could
raise the capital required for the expected construction costs. Using data on sub-
scriptions to canal company stock, Ward (1974) shows that, as with turnpikes, the
canals were organized and financed by those local to the infrastructure. By con-
sequence, as Turnbull (1987) finds, those early canal improvements again served
local markets in a way that was not initially connected to a national system. As
Hadfield (1981) describes, canal companies did not typically also provide carrier
services to those wishing to move freight (until 1845 they were not permitted to
do so without an Act of Parliament). Into the 19th century, the construction of
railways became the means of improvement to inland transportation. Once more,
as Hunt (1935), Broadbridge (1955) and Shea (2012) document, the railways were
often projected for local purposes on the back of local subscriptions to the railway
companies. Broadbridge (1955) finds that ‘local interests’ in financing railways
remained dominant until the latter half of the 19th century.
The formation of an infrastructure company was thus the vehicle to overcome
the fixed costs of an improvement with the aim to increase the value of local land
and the profits of local businesses. Subsequent tolls were typically for mainte-
nance of the infrastructure and for carriage of goods on that infrastructure which
was, particularly for roads and waterways, typically carried out by separate enti-
ties. Given the uncertainties of the new technologies and unknown local demand,
the opportunities for speculation by remote investors were limited and, where
investment mania occurred, schemes began to reserve shares for landowners on
the route and for the inhabitants of local towns (Pollins, 1954). In many cases,
the companies were explicitly promoted as being in the local public interest.8 An
infrastructure company was thus a concern which improved the local economy
first, and provided returns to the company shareholder second.
One further aspect of the history worth noting is the nature of dispute resolu-
tion when alternative proposed routes were in conflict. Since an Act of Parliament
was needed to approve the formation of a trust or joint stock company, competing
interests benefited from submitting a single proposal to Parliament with support
from those Members of Parliament that owned the land along the route. Par-
liament was typically not the venue for conflict; as Harris (2000, p.135) notes,
it “served only as the arena and set the procedural rules.” As such, many non-
controversial projects were approved in Parliament with little conflict. In some
instances, however, neighboring cities and counties disagreed on the route to be
taken by a canal or railway that would connect them. A good example of the
resolution of competing projects is the Leeds and Liverpool Canal, which was au-
thorized in 1770 (see Clarke, 1994). Manufacturers in Yorkshire wanted access to
the Trust (invested in new and improved roads with their attendant Parliamentary and legal costs) and
the latter its current revenue (spent on road repairs, administration, and interest payments)”.
8The motto of the Trent & Mersey Canal, completed in 1777, was Pro Patriam Populumque Fluit –
‘it flows for country and people’ (Hadfield, 1981).
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Atlantic trade and a supply of lime for improving agricultural land, while those in
Lancashire needed access to the coal inland. Committees in both Yorkshire and
Lancashire were formed and as many as five different routes were proposed. A
solution was sought by the employment of an arbitrator who chose a route based
on the interests of both counties. As Clarke (1994, p.68) concludes, “Following
the solution of various disagreements... progress of the Bill through Parliament
was swift.” The resolution of competing railway plans was often less straightfor-
ward, with much debate within Parliament. As Bagwell (1974, p.101) describes,
the main consequence was “a golden harvest” for the solicitors representing each
interest to Parliament. The sum spent on securing Parliamentary authorization
was limited to only two per cent of total outlay on railway capital, at the end
of which Parliament would reconcile competing interests and authorize a single
company.
The pattern of local projection and local finance of transport improvements re-
veals just how endogenous the transport network was to regional economic devel-
opments. Since industrial developments occurred in a small number of hotspots,
thus did infrastructure improve alongside those local developments. Those pro-
ducers wishing to transport their goods faced two costs: First, the infrastructure
company charged a toll on the users of the turnpike, canal or railway. Second, the
carrier (the owner of the wagon or boat) charged a fee based on the quantity and
type of goods to be carried as well as the distance to be travelled. The overall fall
in transport costs over the period was dramatic. Bogart (2014) collates data (see
Figure 5) that demonstrates there was a 95 percent reduction in real shillings per
ton mile from 1700 to 1865 across all forms of transport (road, waterway, rail).
The fall in freight cost between waterways in 1730 to rail in 1865 is 86 percent.
It should be noted that this is a na¨ıve estimate of the decline in transport costs.
The declining freight charges for a growing canal and railway network may be
partially offset by the increasing need to move goods across different parts of
an increasingly multi-modal network. Recent evidence in Alvarez-Palau (2018)
on the costs of trans-shipment across roads, coasts and canals up to 1830 sug-
gests that 15 percent of freight costs can be attributed to trans-shipment. As the
railways later emerged, adding a dimension to trans-shipment costs, real freight
charges would be even higher by the end of our period.
To put British infrastructural development into an historical contrast, we can
compare it with the situation in France and Germany. The Becquet plan of 1822
envisioned a public-private partnership: A centrally planned waterway system
paid for by private capital. A group of civil engineers, the Corps des Ponts et
Chausse´es, was charged with setting and enforcing the regulations for a waterway
network of sufficient quality. As Le´vy-Leboyer (1978) notes, the centralized nature
of infrastructural development in France extended beyond canals and covered also
railways. At their introduction, there was also uncertainty over the role of railways
in the context of the canal plan (Smith, 1990). Even once Napoleon III began to
promote the private finance of a dominant railway infrastructure, private plans
14 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
1700 1750 1800 1850
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
sh
il
li
n
g
s
p
er
to
n
m
il
e
(1
7
0
0
p
ri
ce
s)
road waterway rail
Figure 5. Freight costs (Bogart, 2014)
were still subject to the layout, location and specifications dictated by the Corps.
Milward and Saul (1973, p. 336) argue that government “beset railway building
with so many safeguards as to delay its flourishing by a full decade.” In contrast
to France, disunity of German states meant that no such co-ordinated plan could
be developed. As Smith (1990) notes in regard to Germany, a liberal railroad
law emerged in 1838 “left companies the intiative to propose routes as well as
engineering design” (p.671).
II. Model with exogenous fixed infrastructure
We briefly outline the structure of the model before developing it in detail.
Trew (2014) introduces non-homethetic preferences into the spatial development
framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014, henceforth DR-H). In this set-
up, we have two final goods: Agricultural and manufacturing. As income grows,
the marginal utility from consuming agricultural (manufacturing) goods declines
(increases) and so consumption (and labour demand by firms) shifts towards
manufactured goods. Firms, arranged along an interval of space, hire labour and
rent land; they can also invest in a chance to improve their production technol-
ogy.9 Perfectly mobile workers can move in advance of productivity realisation to
9To establish the importance of modelling with a continuum of locations, we introduce in Appendix
Section A a simple two-region version of this model. We can draw some conclusions from simply com-
paring the first period (year 1710) of the calibrated two-region model to the first period of the calibrated
continuum model. A calibrated two-region model does not have trade in equilibrium with the original
transport cost, misses aggregate labour shares and cannot explain a role for energy prices. There is, in
this instance, merit in treating space as an interval of many locations.
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the location that yields the greatest expected utility. Subsequent to innovation
and production, there is spatial diffusion of productivity before the start of next
period.
Since workers consume at the location of their employment, each point in space
may export one type of final good and import another. Such trade is costly
and, in DR-H and Trew (2014), this cost is assumed to be a fixed iceberg cost.
This present study is of the development of transport infrastructure so we make
additional departures from Trew (2014) as motivated by two facts. First, at an
aggregate level, Section I showed that a substantial portion of labour is employed
in the tertiary sector (that is, without professionals: transport, distribution and
wholesaling). Second, significant resources are expended on improving the stock
of infrastructure at a location by, for example, improving roads or constructing
canals. Transport costs at a location are determined by both the labour employed
in transport and wholesaling and by the stock of transport infrastructure at a
location. Moreover, both the labour employed and the stock of infrastructure
varies significantly across space and changes over time.
In this section, we make transport costs endogenous to the infrastructure sup-
ply at each location. Infrastructure supply is part stock of fixed infrastructure,
which we initially take to be exogenous, and part labour used to facilitate the
transportation of goods through a location. Conditions on the equilibrium rela-
tionship between infrastructure stock, transport labour and transport costs for
equilibrium are identified. In particular, while equilibrium trade determines the
demand for labour in transport, that labour in transport is also drawing labour
away from the production of final goods. As such, we need to ensure that an
equilibrium in the goods and labour markets exists. We consider the quantita-
tive performance of the model against the data in Section III. In Section IV, we
make the supply of fixed infrastructure over connected intervals endogenous to
investments by infrastructure companies in those intervals.
A. Preferences
Agents earn a wage w(`, t) from supplying labour to firms which are ordered
at points ` on the closed interval of land [0, 1], as in DR-H. Agents also hold a
diversified portfolio of all land and so receive an equal share of all rental income,
R(t)/L¯ where R(t) is the aggregate land rent and L¯ is the fixed total labour
supply. There is no storage good. A consumer solves the following optimization
problem,
(1) max
{cA(`,t),cM (`,t)}∞0
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU (cA(`, t), cM (`, t))
s.t. w(`, t) +
R(t)
L¯
= pA(`, t)cA(`, t) + pM (`, t)cM (`, t), ∀(`, t),
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where cA(`, t) and cM (`, t) is consumption of agricultural and manufacturing
goods, respectively, pA(`, t) and pA(`, t) are prices of agricultural and manufactur-
ing goods, respectively, and U(·) is the instantaneous utility function that takes
the following Stone-Geary form, as in Trew (2014),
(2) U(cA(`, t), cM (`, t)) = (cA(`, t)− γ)η(cM (`, t))1−η
where η ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0 captures a subsistence requirement in agriculture.
Given free mobility of labour, equilibrium prices, wages and rental income equalize
utility to u¯ across all locations at a given point in time.
B. Firms and innovation
A firm at location ` can produce either agricultural or manufacturing goods
using labour Li(`, t) and productive land
10 (which is normalized to one),
A(`, t) = ZA(`, t)LA(`, t)
α,(3)
M(`, t) = ZM (`, t)LM (`, t)
µ,(4)
where α < µ captures agricultural production that is more land intensive and
where ZA(`, t) and ZM (`, t) are the location-dependent productivity levels in each
sector.
Prior to hiring labour and making a bid for land, firms may expend resources
on obtaining a draw for better technology at their location. In particular, a firm
buys a probability φ of innovating at sector-dependent cost ψi(φ). If a firm is
successful in innovating, it draws a zˆ from a Pareto distribution with minimum
value 1 and Pareto parameter ai.
11 Successful innovation yields a production
technology of zˆZi(`, t). We let the expected draw be greater in manufacturing
than in agriculture (i.e., aA > aM ). The expected technology for a firm that
spends resources on a chance at innovation is thus,
(5) E (Zi(`, t)|Zi) =
(
φ
ai − 1 + 1
)
Zi.
Firms that attempt to innovate may offer a greater rent to landowners if the
expected gains from innovating outweigh the costs. However, at the end of each
period (after production and consumption), technology in each sector is spatially
10Each location can hold transport infrastructure on unproductive land.
11We assume that innovation draws are spatially correlated – firms arbitrarily close receive the same
innovation otherwise an infinite number of draws combined with continuous diffusion would lead to
infinite productivity.
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diffused with decay δ, that is,
(6) Zi(`, t) = max
r∈[0,1]
e−δ|`−r|Zi(r, t− 1).
Since labour is perfectly mobile, and since technology diffuses at the end of
each period, DR-H show that despite the persistence of the new technologies that
emerge from innovation, the advantage to innovators dissipates leaving the firm
problem as a maximization of current-period profits. That is, a firm chooses φi
to solve,
(7) max
φi
pi(`, t)
(
φ
ai − 1 + 1
)
ZiLˆi(`, t)
ı − w(`, t)Lˆi(`, t)− Rˆi(`, t)− ψ(φ(`, t)),
There are fixed and marginal costs to obtaining a chance of innovation. As in
Trew (2014), we let these costs vary by sector and, in particular, we account for
the feature of industrial growth that innovative manufacturing technologies were
more energy-intensive than agricultural ones. The cost of drawing a probability
of innovation φ in sector i is,
(8) ψi(φ) = ψ1,i + Γiξ(`) + ψ2,i
(
1
1− φ
)
if φ > 0,
where ξ(`) is the energy cost at location `,12 ψ1,i > 0 is the fixed cost parameter,
ψ2,i > 0 is the marginal cost parameter and Γi = 1 if i = M and 0 otherwise.
13
Conditional on the expected net gain being positive, firms choose the φ that
maximize the expected increase in net profits, that is, the optimal investment
probability is,
(9) φ∗i (`, t) = 1−
(
ψ2,i(ai − 1)
pi(`, t)Zi(`, t)Lˆi(`, t)ı
)1/2
.
As can be seen from equation (9), there is a scale effect present in the intensity
of innovation: Higher output at a location is accompanied by a higher optimal
innovation probability.
12We choose this form of energy costs as an alternative to introducing a second secondary production
technology since we do not have data to initialize the model with seperate energy-intensive secondary and
traditional secondary sectors. In practice, once a firm begins to find it optimal to draw an innovation it
continues to do so in each period thereafter (thus generating the sustained growth observed in simulations
below).
13As in DR-H, in simulations we make ψ(·) proportional to wages to ensure that the cost of innovation
keeps pace with the growing economy.
18 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
C. Transport costs and tertiary labor
Transport infrastructure at a location is composed of a fixed infrastructure
(roads, canals, railway tracks) and a transportation service (which would include
carriage services, rolling stock, and so on). We assume that the fixed infras-
tructure is free to access and exogenously fixed until Section IV. In this section,
we introduce the role of a landowner-carrier that provides transportation services.
The carrier charges a toll for the carrying of freight and the construction of rolling
stock to run on the fixed infrastructure. We assume that the rolling stock fully
depreciates each period. While full depreciation is a simplification, the difference
between the longevity of the fixed infrastructure and rolling stock is clear in Eng-
land and Wales, as elsewhere, where new trains can run on Victorian tracks and
where new lorries drive on decades-old roads.
Both the fixed infrastructure and the transportation service determine the cost
of transporting goods through a location. The transport cost is made up of a
physical cost, κ¯(`, t), and a toll, κ˜(`, t), charged by landowner-carriers. The total
transport cost is,
(10) κ(`, t) = κ¯(`, t) + κ˜(`, t).
The physical cost results directly from the level of the local fixed infrastructure
stock, T (`, t). Improving fixed infrastructure reduces the cost of transporting
goods by, for example, increasing the speed of travel or by increasing the quality
of transportation (reducing spoilage, spillage, and so on). This physical cost is
akin to a standard ‘iceberg’ cost and is lost to the economy. However, the toll is
charged by a landowner to fund the production of the transportation service and
is paid to transportation workers who then use that income to consume goods.
Since the toll κ˜(`, t) is not lost to the economy in a normal iceberg-sense, the
price of a good i being shipped from location s to location r is thus a function of
the physical cost alone,
(11) pi(r, t) = exp
{∫ r
s
κ¯(`, t)d`
}
pi(s, t).
That is, the price of good shipped from location s to location r takes account of
the accumulated melt of the shipped good,
∫ r
s κ¯(`, t)d`. In DR-H, the iceberg cost
is assumed to be fixed and labor is used only in the production of consumption
goods, so κ¯(`, t) = κ and equation (11) reduces to pi(r, t) = e
κ|r−s|pi(s, t).
In this paper, both parts of the transport cost are endogenous. We take the
physical transport cost κ¯(`, t) to be a decreasing function of the fixed infrastruc-
ture stock, T (`, t),
(12) κ¯(`, t) = κe−T (`,t),
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where κ > 0. In other words, a better infrastructure stock means faster (or
more secure) transport and less melt of goods. Since infrastructure is built on
unproductive land at each location, a higher T (`, t) does not reduce the land
available at that location for firms.14 We keep T (`, t) fixed until Section IV.
The toll is determined by a landowner who produces a transportation service
to transport goods using a CES production technology YT that is a function of
an economy-wide transport efficiency, ZT (t), transport labour hired, LT (`, t), and
the local fixed infrastructure,
(13) YT (`, t) = ZT (t) [ζLT (`, t)
r + (1− ζ)T (`, t)r] 1r .
where ZT (t) is exogenous but can grow over time. Production is characterized
by a constant elasticity of substitution between LT and T and we assume that
transport labour and fixed infrastructure are substitutes, r ∈ (0, 1). An individual
landowner takes the fixed infrastructure as given, choosing labour LT (`, t) to
maximize its return,
(14) piT (`, t) = κ˜(`, t)YT (`, t)− LT (`, t)w(`, t).
For a given toll, the optimal choice of transport labour, LˆT (`, t), taking ZT , T ,
and w as exogenous, is,
(15) LˆT (`, t) =
{[(
w(`, t)
κ˜(`, t)ZT (t)ζ
) r
1−r
− ζ
]
/(1− ζ)
}− 1
r
T (`, t)
Local labour employed in transport is, ceteris paribus, increasing in transport
productivity, infrastructure stock and the toll, decreasing in the local wage rate.
The demand for transportation services, D(`, t), is the sum of output pro-
duced at a location (which requires wholesaling and distribution) and that traded
through the location (which requires transportation). The trade flow arriving at
a location is taken as given by its individual landowner. Since firms use a fixed
amount of land and choose labour and technology investment optimally subject
to wages and prices, the output of a given sector at a location is also invariant
to the rent charged. As such, an individual landowner takes this demand for
transportation services to be exogenous. The toll that satisfies demand, using
14At peak, there were 35,684km of turnpikes in 1838, 9,069 km of navigable waterway in 1848 and
31,824 km of railway in 1920. At an average width of 20m for each mode of transport, this makes
1,531km2 used by these transport infrastructures. The area of England and Wales is 151,174km2. This
suggests that transport infrastructure used around 1 percent of total land, which is consistent with
estimates of the land used by modern road networks of around 1.5-2 percent (Rodrigue, 2017).
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YT (`, t) = D(`, t) and equations (13) and (15), is,
(16) κˆ(`, t) =
w(`, t)
ZT (t)ζ
{
ζ(1− ζ)
[(
D(`, t)
ZT (t)T (`, t)
)r
− 1
]−1
+ ζ
} r−1
r
.
Equation (16) is the minimum toll a landowner must charge to hire the transport
labour required to produce the output to meet the demand at their location.
The minimum toll is increasing in the demand for transportation services and so,
by equation (15), is the local demand for transport labour. For a given level of
demand, the toll is decreasing in ZT and T , increasing in w.
Since land is modelled as an interval, we assume that all locations between
two points r and s must be traversed. Any landowner between r and s could
thus choose to set κ˜(`, t) = 1 to seize all trade flow for local consumption. In
a two-dimensional reality, a landowner that did so would find that trade flows
around their location by an indirect route over land or by shipping by sea along
the coast. For the purposes of this model, we suppose that at each location
there is an indirect shipping technology that is identical to equation (13) but has
efficiency Z˘T (t) = (1− ε)ZT (t). We may think of this lower efficiency as resulting
from the loading of goods onto and off of vessels that would otherwise would
go through a location. By (16), this alternative implies a higher minimum toll
at each location and so ε captures the technological cost of shipping indirectly.
This limits a landowners rent from being the monopoly provider of transportation
services at their location. For simplicity we let this ε become negligibly small.
Lemma 1 establishes the choice of toll and conditions for it to be bounded.
LEMMA 1: (i) The toll, κ˜(`, t), approaches equation (16) as ε → 0 in the
presence of indirect shipping. (ii) κˆ(`, t) ∈ (0, 1) if D(`, t) > ZT (t)T (`, t) and
w(`, t) < ZT (t)ζ
1/r for all t and `.
PROOF:
(i) Indirect shipping around location ` with efficiency Z˘T (t) implies a minimum
toll κ˘(`, t) > κˆ(`, t) at each location. If a landowner charges more than the
alternative shipping then consumption at each location is constrained to that
produced locally. Since each location specializes in one sector, worker utility
would be zero at any location not engaging in trade. As a result, a landowner
sets κ˜(`, t) = κ˘(`, t) and as limε→0 κ˘(`, t) = κˆ(`, t). (ii) That κˆ(`, t) > 0 if D(`, t) >
ZT (t)T (`, t) follows from equation (13); if demand for transportation services can
be satisfied without transport labour then the toll is zero. If D(`, t)/[ZT (t)T (`, t)]
grows over time, (16) makes clear that limt→∞ κˆ(`, t) = w(`, t)/[ZT (t)ζ1/r].
With the toll determined by (16), transport labour is simply,
(17) LˆT =
{[(
D(`, t)
ZT (`, t)T (`, t)
)r
− 1
]
/ζ
}1/r
T (`, t).
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Equations (15) and (16) capture two forms of congestion since higher transport
demand generates a higher toll and greater tertiary labour. A higher toll lessens
the increase in trade and the greater transport labour increases local consumption
of the final goods. As such, we require that an increase in output at a location
is not fully absorbed by a higher toll or by higher local consumption of the extra
tertiary labour. The same is true of an increase in trade that results from higher
output. The requirement that congestion is not overwhelming places a slightly
stronger restriction on the level of demand relative to non-labour transport input,
as the following Lemma shows.
LEMMA 2: A sufficient condition for a limited congestion effect on the toll ∂κˆ∂D <
1 is D(`, t)/[ZT (t)T (`, t)] > 2
1/r for all t and `.
PROOF:
From equation (16),
∂κˆ(`, t)
∂D(`, t)
=
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
w(`, t)
ZT (t)ζ
(1− r)(ζ(1− ζ))
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷{
ζ(1− ζ)
[(
D(`, t)
ZT (t)T (`, t)
)r
− 1
]−1
+ ζ
}1/r
×
×
[(
D(`, t)
ZT (t)T (`, t)
)r
− 1
]−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
(
D(`, t)
ZT (t)T (`, t)
)r−1
(ZT (t)T (`, t))
−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
(18)
Equation (18) is the product of four positive parts each in the unit interval. Since
κˆ(`, t) > 0, w(`, t) < ZT (t)ζ
1/r < ZT (t)ζ and by assumption r ∈ (0, 1) and
ζ ∈ (0, 1) so we know that part (a) is in (0, 1). Since ζ ∈ (0, 1), (b) is a convex
combination of two parts less than or equal to one if D(`, t)/[ZT (t)T (`, t)] > 2
1/r.
Part (c) is less than one by the same argument on D(`, t)/[ZT (t)T (`, t)] > 2
1/r.
Part (d) is in (0, 1) since each bracket is greater than one. Since ∂κˆ∂D < 1, by
equation (15) ∂LT∂D is bounded
While tertiary labour is determined by economic activity it also determines
economic activity via its effect on the labour supply remaining for production
of the final good. For labour markets to clear, we need the sum of agricultural,
manufacturing labour and tertiary labour to equal the total labour supply.
D. Equilibrium in land, labour and goods
Landowners rent land to the firm that offers the highest rental payment,
(19) R(`, t) = max
{
RˆA(`, t), RˆM (`, t)
}
.
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where Rˆi(`, t) is the maximum land bid that a firm in sector i can make at location
`, conditional on optimal labour and innovation decisions.
We let θi(`, t) = 1 if firm i ∈ {A,M} is producing at (`, t). Following Rossi-
Hansberg (2005), Hi(`, t) is the stock of excess supply of good i between locations
0 and `. This Hi(`, t) is defined by Hi(0, t) = 0 and the following partial differ-
ential equation, where xi(`, t) is net output of firm i ∈ {A,M},
(20)
∂Hi(`, t)
∂`
= θixi(`, t)− ci(`, t)
(∑
i
θi(`, t)Lˆi(`, t) + LˆT (`, t)
)
− κ¯(`, t)|Hi(`, t)|,
where, again, κ¯ appears since it is that portion of goods traded which is lost to
the economy. Clearing in each traded good i requires Hi(1, t) = 0. Equilibrium
in the labour market requires that the sum of labour in transport and in each
sector is equal to L¯,
(21)
∫ 1
0
LˆT (`, t) +
∑
i
θi(`, t)Lˆi(`, t)d` = L¯
Let L˜G(t), denote the total labour that goes to production of agricultural and
manufacturing goods at time t and L˜T (t) =
∫ 1
0 LˆT (`, t)d`.
LEMMA 3: There is a L˜T such that: i) The labour in production L˜G generates
equilibrium outputs and trade flows associated with that L˜T via equation (15);
and, ii) market clearing equation (21) holds.
PROOF:
Let ϕ(L˜G) be the total tertiary labour implied by a total productive labour
supply of L˜G = LA + LM , that is, ϕ(L˜G) = max
{∫ 1
0 L˜T (`, t)d`
∣∣L˜G, 0} using
equation (15). Clearly, ϕ(0) = 0. A higher L˜G weakly increases Y (`, t) and
|H(`, t)| for all ` ∈ [0, 1] and so ϕ′ > 0 by equation (16). Total labour demand
is Γ(L˜G) = ϕ(L˜G) + L˜G which is thus increasing in L˜G. Total labour supply is
fixed at L¯ and so labour market clearing requires Γ(L˜G) = L¯. Since Γ(0) = 0 and
Γ′ > 0, there is a L˜∗G > 0 at which Γ(L˜
∗
G) = L¯.
Having established that an equilibrium can exist in which tertiary labour is
endogenous to output and trade across space, we proceed to simulate the model
to consider its performance in matching the industrial revolution.
III. Quantitative analysis
The model presented in Section II can be simulated and compared to quanti-
tative evidence. We do so using occupational information for England and Wales
over the period 1710–1881. A particular advantage of using data for England and
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Wales is that, as described below, we can map 2-dimensional data into a North-
South interval that captures many of the distinct spatial features of the country.
We use the initial distribution of labour in agriculture and manufacturing to ini-
tialize the spatial distribution of productivity levels and, having parameterized
other parts of the model using available evidence, we run the simulation for 171
periods and compare its predictions against the evidence. Before turning to the
endogenous infrastructure stock, we can consider the extent to which the model
with endogenous tertiary labour matches the aggregate and spatial features of
structural transformation, as well as macroeconomic variables such as per capita
growth, average relative prices and average land rents.
A. Application to England and Wales
In order to initialize the model, and to compare its output to the evidence, we
need to map the 2-dimensional occupational and infrastructural information into
the 1-dimensional interval of the model. A benefit of using England and Wales
for this purpose is that it is of a roughly North-South orientation. To transform
the 2-dimensional map of England and Wales we, first, sum occupations along the
East-West axis at each point along the North-South axis and then, second, scale
each East-West sum by the inverse of the East-West distance. Doing so makes
the North-South interval invariant to the East-West size of the country. However,
since the South is both more agricultural and broader in the East-West dimension,
this scaling generates a slightly lower primary share on aggregate. We thus make
a third adjustment and fit the aggregate share to that in the original data by
uniformly adjusting employment at all locations. The North-South orientation is
then the interval we use to connect with the model (see Figure 6). In simulations,
we work with 500 discrete and equally-sized ‘parishes’ that make up the whole,
so the interval in the figures are mapped into this [0, 500] interval for comparison
to simulation output. Also shown in Figure 6 are the decimal latitudes that we
use to refer to locations in the data and in simulation output.
Despite this simplification of the data, many parts of the occupational geogra-
phy are recognizable in the interval representation. Figure 7 depicts normalized
total employment mapped into the interval at three dates.15 Evident in the fig-
ure around latitude 51.5◦ is the city of London. Also visible is the growth in
the labour employed in the North of England around 53.5◦ and the relative de-
cline in dominance of London. The interval permits an understanding of both
the geographical distance from London to the hotspot in the North and of the
magnitude of the shift of employment from the South to the North. One way to
look at the occupational structure using the interval representation is to consider
the occupational structure at each location. Figure 8 shows this at three dates.
15For comparison, online appendix figure 1 gives the interval distribution of total employed without
making an East-West adjustment. As can be seen, employment in the middle of the interval appears
slightly higher where there is a large East-West breadth while that toward 53.5◦ appears lower as the
country’s breadth tapers.
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Figure 6. England and Wales Interval
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While the secondary sector remains relatively stable over the period, the primary
sector becomes increasing spatially concentrated. This is a result of the growth
of the tertiary sector that occurs most rapidly after 1817 and, strikingly, occurs
all over the country. This points to the particular role of the tertiary sector in
transport and distribution of the increased output of the primary and secondary
sectors; it grows in importance both within and between cities. It also shows that
the features seen in the 2-dimensional maps (Figures 2–4) are replicated in the
1-dimensional interval representation.
Figure 7. Interval distribution of total employed (normalized)
B. Parameterization
To parameterize the initial spatial distribution of productivity in primary and
secondary sectors, we use the 1710 spatial distribution of employment in each
sector. In particular, we invert the production functions, equations (3)-(4), to
obtain an expression for local productivity as a function of labour, prices and
wages at each location. We then use observations for labour employed along
with prices and wages which solve the model. Since the initial spatial diffusion of
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Figure 8. Sector Proportions (bottom to top: primary, secondary, tertiary)
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technologies in the model creates a jump in productivity levels (both on aggregate
and spatially), we report model output starting at t = 1 after a t = 0 diffusion of
technology in each sector. (see Trew, 2014, for more detail).
The baseline parameterization is given in Table 1. We select ζ and r to fit
the initial aggregate level and spatial distribution of tertiary labour in the model
to that observed in the data. Setting r < 1 captures a substitutability between
labour and infrastructure stock in the production of transportation services. The
preference parameters η and γ are chosen to match the initial share of labour
in agriculture and manufacturing as well as the extent of the shift out of agri-
culture over the period. We use Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) to pin-down
the production parameters α and µ; as described above, µ > α since agricultural
production is relatively more land-intensive. The Pareto parameters, aM and
aA, are chosen to match the historical record on growth rates. As Allen (2004)
documents, there was a long, slow growth agricultural productivity in the period
leading up to the industrial revolution; aA captures a near-doubling of productiv-
ity every 150 years. The manufacturing innovation parameter, aM , generates a
long-run manufacturing growth rate of 2 percent as in Crafts and Harley (1992).
The fixed and marginal costs for innovation are chosen to, first, begin at t = 1
(year 1710) with some agricultural innovation and, second, to pin down the tim-
ing of the takeoff of manufacturing innovation in the baseline simulation. The
diffusion decay parameter, δ, affects the pace of takeoff and so we choose is to
match the evidence in Crafts and Harley (1992).
The initial transport parameter is set at κ = 0.3. This means an initial physical
transport cost of 0.11 (compared with κ = 0.008 in DR-H) to capture the large
costs to transporting goods in the early 18th century. We set T (`, t) to be fixed
for all t at the initial distribution of access to transport in 1710.16 For energy
prices, we use data in Clark and Jacks (2007) and Allen (2009) on the relative
price of coal at different locations in 1700. In counterfactual exercises below we
vary the initial distribution of the coal price and interact it with developments in
transport costs.
C. Simulation output
Results from using the baseline calibration are reported in Figures 9-15. In
each figure, the thick line is a mean average of 100 simulations with shading to
represent a confidence interval of two standard deviations around the mean. Since
the model incorporates a continuum of firms, the randomness of innovation real-
izations should disappear on aggregate in a single run. However, as in DR-H, we
model a finite number of discrete intervals that each receive the same innovation
realization. That the confidence intervals are relatively tight to the mean model
16At 1710 there is some variation in access to early turnpikes and navigable rivers. The calculation of
this is described in Section V.A. In practice, relative to the later emergence of canals and railway, this
implies a distribution of underlying fixed infrastructure that is close to being spatially uniform.
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Table 1—Parameterisation for baseline model
β 0.95 Standard discount factor.
ZA(`, 0) See text Data in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) and own working.
ZM (`, 0)
κ 0.3 High initial transport cost.
T (`, 0) See text
ζ 0.85
To match aggregate initial tertiary labour in
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a).
r 0.7
ZT (0) 1.50
γT 1.02 Estimate of TFP growth from Bogart (2014).
xT /N 1.15 Construction costs in Pollins (1952) and nominal
GDP in Mitchell (1988).
η 0.175 To match aggregate employment shares over
1710-1860 in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a).γ 0.05
α 0.59 Firm-level employment share for agriculture in
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).µ 0.67
aM 70 Long-run growth of 2 percent, Heston, Summers and
Aten (2011).
aA 305 Slow early agricultural growth rate, Allen (2004).
δ 15 To match speed of takeoff in Crafts and Harley (1992).
ψ1,A 0.3976 A takeoff in agriculture at t = 1.
ψ1,M 1.1355 Timing of manufacturing takeoff as in Crafts and
Harley (1992).ψ2,A, ψ2,M 0.002
ξ(`) See text Coal prices from Allen (2009), Clark and Jacks
(2007).
L¯ 100 Normalised total labor supply.
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output suggests that the chosen number of discrete intervals is enough to ensure
that separate runs of the model do not generate widely different outcomes.
Figure 9 gives the performance of the model in terms of a number of macroe-
conomic variables. The takeoff in growth matches the timing and magnitude of
that reported in Mokyr (2004). The relative price of manufactured goods cap-
tures the decline observed in the data (calculated using the method in Yang and
Zhu, 2009). The path of real wages and average land rent is consistent with the
data in Clark (2002) although with perhaps too much increase in real wages and
too little increase in land rents.
Figure 9. Baseline Simulation: Macroeconomic Variables
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
In terms of the aggregate structural transformation, Figure 10 demonstrates
some success in matching the data described in Section I. Employment in the
secondary sector exhibits a slow, steady increase over the whole period. This
is despite that sector generating the increases in productivity that underpin the
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takeoff in growth. The more rapid decline of the primary sector after 1800 is ac-
companied by a larger acceleration in the employment of the tertiary sector. The
driver of this change is the increased output and trade referred to by Shaw-Taylor
et al. (2010a) which in the model causes a greater demand for transportation ser-
vices. Absent the endogenous tertiary sector, the model would not explain the
slow change in the relative importance of the secondary sector alongside the fast
change in the relative importance of the primary. As is clear, the growth in the
relative importance of tertiary labour outstrips that in the data and a consequence
is that the primary sector falls too much and the secondary sector grows too little.
Since infrastructure is fixed in this version of the model, landowners can respond
to the increased demand for transport services only by hiring more labour. As we
will see in Section IV, when we permit investments in fixed infrastructure, some
of the pressure on tertiary labour can be relieved by investment in infrastructure
improvements.
Figure 10. Baseline Simulation: Structural Transformation (percent labor share)
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
The benefit of using a model that incorporates continuous space is that it can be
compared against data that offers a high spatial resolution. To that end, Figure 11
plots the model implications for the distribution of primary employment against
the data at three dates (1710, 1817 and 1881).17 Productivity growth in the
17The discrepancy between 1710 and 1817 at around 51.5 in Figure 11 is a result of the reconstruction of
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agricultural ‘south’ of the interval (over the latitude range of roughly 50.5◦ to 52◦)
occurs endogenously as firms there are initially larger and can amortize the fixed
costs of innovation. This causes primary output to specialize in the south in a way
that mirrors the data, although less clearly in 1881, and which is consistent with
the literature (Allen, 2004). The localized agricultural innovations cause labour
to be more concentrated than in the data. The eventual decline in the southern
primary workforce in response to the shift toward manufactured goods matches
that in the data. However, the complete primary-secondary specialization in each
location means that the model misses some primary employment in the South at
1710 and some primary employment in the North at 1881. Figure 8 places the
data in Figure 11 in context – while there are areas of high primary employment
shares in the North, they decline in relative terms as the secondary sector grows.
For example, the high primary employment level in 1881 around latitude 53.5◦ is
only around one sixth of the level of secondary employment at the same location.
The model captures the relatively high share of primary employment in the South
and, as we see below, the relatively high share of secondary employment in the
North. Moreover, the specialization is not critical for the ability of the model to
capture the industrial takeoff – the model captures a slow agricultural revolution
in the South in spite of missing some primary employment in London at 1710.
As the agricultural revolution proceeds in the south, consumption demand,
and so labour employed, shifts towards manufacturing firms. That raises the
optimal size of manufacturing firms and makes them more likely to be able to
offer land rents in excess of those offered by agricultural firms. The growing
scale of manufacturing firms also means they may amortize the fixed cost of
innovation over a larger output, while because of the scale-effect in equation (9)
the innovation intensity increases. At t = 72 (year 1782), manufacturing firms at
latitude 53.7 find it optimal to invest in innovation. Thereafter, the innovation-
driven industrial revolution proceeds; aggregate growth increases and the shift
of consumption out of agriculture accelerates. As Figure 12 shows, labour in
the secondary sector moves toward a northern hotspot. The location of this
industrial hotspot matches the data, though the size of the takeoff in the model
is in excess of that in the data. The secondary employment in the model also
predicts that London (around latitude 51.4◦), declines more than in the data.
In reality, of course, London continued to be an important centre of activity
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, there are a number
of things not in the model that make London different. Following its founding
by the Romans, London grew into the administrative and legal capital of the
country, eventually forming a large part of the first financial revolution following
the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Its principal sources of employment throughout
the 1710 data using the roughly 10 percent of the 11,102 ancient parishes for which we have occupational
information at that date. As described in Trew (2015), occupational information for registration districts
in 1710 is estimated using a parish-level regression model to predict the missing parish information before
aggregating up to the 624 registrations districts. Given the large number of residents of London, the
primary sector there is likely over-represented at 1710.
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Figure 11. Baseline Simulation: Primary Employment
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
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this period were not those sectors that underpinned the industrial revolution.
As the model is of only one sector, a better comparison is to the single sector,
textiles, that during this period drove industrial growth. As Figure 13 shows,
the model captures the location, timing and magnitude (once rescaled) of the
takeoff in textiles employment. Moreover, we can consider whether the model
would still be able to capture the endogenous emergence of a Northern hotspot if
London were arbitrarily forced to persist. What triggers the rise of the industrial
hotspot in the North is a steady increase in the relative price of manufactured
goods that results from the slow agricultural revolution in the South. With an
arbitrary ‘capital employment’ in the secondary sector added to the model around
51.4◦, we would still see this change in relative prices so long as the agricultural
revolution in the South occurs.
Figure 12. Baseline Simulation: Secondary Employment
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
Finally, we can consider the spatial fit of the model to the tertiary employment
data. As Figure 14 shows, the model does well in matching much of the local ter-
tiary employment, particularly in the initial period and in the industrial hotspot
that emerges. The model does less well in others (such as, again, in London).
The model prediction for the transport labour in the industrial region is greater
than that in the data, again since infrastructure supply is fixed in this version of
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Figure 13. Baseline Simulation: Textiles Employment (rescaled)
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
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the model. One of the most salient aspects of the dynamism of the tertiary sector
was shown in Figures 4 and 8, that the growth of the tertiary sector grew as a
proportion of local employment in a highly uniform way. As Figure 15 shows, the
model is able to explain the uniform upward shift in the share of tertiary employ-
ment across the interval.18 This is quite distinct from the model implications for
the primary and secondary sectors which mirror the data in concentrating in one
region. The model over-estimates the share in the middle of the interval. This
partly results from the assumption that goods are traded wholly across the land.
As a result, the model predicts that the accumulated traded good peaks around
53.1◦. In reality, some trade would take place in coastal shipping which would
connect points in the South with the North without inducing transport labour
demand in the Midlands. In being able to match the data with the tertiary sector
explained as a function of output and trade in the other sectors, the findings are
consistent with the hypothesis presented in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a).
D. Counterfactual policies
Before moving to the model with endogenous infrastructure investment, we can
consider the impact of policies that might be used to stimulate industrial takeoff.
There are two main mechanisms at work in the impact of these policies. First,
since tertiary labour is not directly productive, policies that release labour into the
primary and secondary sectors can bring forward the point of industrial takeoff
since they can increase the size of firms and make it more likely that a firm can
amortize the fixed costs of innovation. Second, a policy can, directly or indirectly,
affect transport costs which can have a consequence for the spatial concentration
of firms. We present in Table 2 the results of four counterfactual exercises and
the baseline from Section III.C. The table reports the year of the first instance of
manufacturing innovation (the year of takeoff), the decimal latitude of that first
innovation, the average transport cost in period 1 and the average labour share
in period 1.
A first intervention is to exogenously improve the technology used by landown-
ers to transport goods. We run the baseline simulation with a 25 percent im-
provement to ZT (`, 0) = 1.875. An improved transport technology significantly
reduces the labour required to supply a given level of transportation demand and
so reduces the toll charged for a given demand. Demand for those transporta-
tion services increases as more labour is used in manufacturing and agriculture
but, by Lemma 2, this does not induce an net increase in transport labour. The
consequence of releasing labour into the non-transport sectors is that firms are
18Online appendix figures 2–3 report similar figures with shares for the primary and secondary sectors.
Since in the model each location specializes in the production of one good, the fit of the shares to the
data is not as clear as in the tertiary employment. What Figures ??-?? show is that the ability of the
model to fit other aspects of the data, such as the local levels of primary and secondary employment, as
well as aggregate variables, is principally down to the movement of population across space, rather than
changes in local employment shares.
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Figure 14. Baseline Simulation: Tertiary Employment
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
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Figure 15. Baseline Simulation: Tertiary Shares
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
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Table 2—Baseline and Counterfactuals
takeoff takeoff years initial initial
year latitude to 1.5 percent av. κ LT percent
Baseline 1781.7 53.7◦ 59.3 0.20 8.00
1. Better transport technology 1761.7 53.7◦ 58.3 0.19 6.15
2. Transport labour subsidy 1781.6 53.7◦ 59.4 0.19 8.00
3. Higher transport costs 1770.8 53.7◦ 57.2 0.24 8.00
4. Lower transport costs 1798.8 53.7◦ 62.2 0.19 8.00
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
larger and innovation happens in more places. Takeoff happens in year 1761.7 on
average, twenty years earlier than without the intervention (counterfactual 1 in
Table 2).
The second counterfactual reduces the cost of transport labour by placing a
subsidy of 25 percent on the wages paid by landowners. Since the lower wages
do not directly affect the non-transport sectors, the demand for transportation
services is not significantly affected and the share of labour in the transport sector
does not change. The consequence of the lower wages is that the tolls charged
by landowners decrease marginally but this has no consequence for the average
takeoff time. Recall that the toll enters the model in a different way to the physical
transport cost, which is lost to the economy.
A more stark demonstration of the impact of transport costs is shown in the
third and fourth counterfactuals in which the fixed infrastructure parameter κ
in equation (12) is varied by increasing it to κ = 0.375 in counterfactual 3 and
decreasing to κ = 0.275 in counterfactual 4. A higher transport cost generates an
average takeoff year that is nearly 10 years earlier than in the baseline because
it encourages concentration, particularly in the agriculture sector, that makes it
more likely the firms will reach the scale required to overcome the fixed costs
of innovation. That faster growth in agriculture means labor moves into manu-
facturing more quickly, making the date at which manufacturing firms begin to
innovate happen earlier. By the same logic, counterfactual 4 shows that a lower
transport cost pushes back the date of takeoff considerably. This finding relates
with Proposition 3 in DR-H, in which an exogenous increase in transport costs
raises aggregate productivity. In this case, a reduction in transport costs reduces
the strength of agglomeration, reducing firm size and slightly delaying the year at
which manufacturing firms can overcome the fixed costs of innovation. As we will
see in Section V.D, when we conduct counterfactual exercises on the model with
endogenous infrastructure supply, the spatial distribution of a change in transport
costs and release of transport labour can matter to the impact on takeoff.
Each of these counterfactuals point to the importance of scale for the takeoff
in manufacturing. An economy characterized by less labour used in transport,
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or by more concentrated cities, is more likely to have firms of the size sufficient
to overcome the fixed costs of innovation. None of these counterfactual exercises
move the location of takeoff (to one decimal point).
E. Counterfactual energy prices
The factors that determine the location of takeoff include the distance from
the largest market (London), the local initial productivity in manufacturing and
the local price of energy. There are three areas of relatively high manufacturing
productivity at 1710 that can be seen in Figure 7 – the large agglomeration
of London (51.4◦), the smaller North (54◦) and the Midlands (52.8◦) which is
smaller again. The local price of energy is determined by both deposits of coal
and the cost of transporting it (see Clark and Jacks (2007) and Allen (2009)). In
1710, the price of coal in London was over six times that in the North and over
seven times that in Newcastle (55◦). The counterfactual exercises in the previous
Section show that the location of takeoff does not change when modify the cost
of transportation when it only affects the cost of transporting goods. In this
subsection, we explore the sensitivity of takeoff location to changes in the spatial
distribution of coal prices.
We first impose a uniform drop in coal prices across all locations, keeping other
parameters as in the baseline calibration in Table 1. A 56.6 percent drop in
coal prices across all locations is required for the location of industrial takeoff to
move. With this decline, the location of the industrial revolution (that location at
which manufacturing first begins to innovate) shifts to 51.4◦ (London) and occurs
much earlier than in the baseline simulation (at year 1710). Next, we introduce
counterfactuals that change the spatial distribution of coal prices, rather than
simply reducing them everywhere. Holding the price in London constant, we
ask how much coal prices need to drop in other potential industrial locations for
the industrial revolution to happen there. Newcastle is the source of initially very
cheap energy. Based on the baseline calibration, even setting the price of energy to
zero in Newcastle is not sufficient to induce an industrial takeoff there first. Coal
was in reality close to free at times in this region – since it lay so close to the surface
of the earth in that region, ‘sea coal’ could simply be picked up from the beaches
of County Durham. Newcastle has low initial manufacturing productivity and is
a great distance from London; since the fixed costs to innovation are still positive
when energy costs are zero, firms in Newcastle never see a positive gain from
investing in innovation. Surprisingly, the same is also true of the Midlands. Even
with energy costs at zero in the Midlands, the first innovation in manufacturing
still happens in the initially more productive North with its relatively cheap (but
not free) energy. In other words, it is not alone the price of coal that matters; the
initial advantage that the North had in manufacturing productivity is crucial to
explain its place as the geographical cradle of the Industrial Revolution.19
19This outcome is partly the result of the adjustment for the breadth of the country in the transforma-
40 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
IV. Model with endogenous fixed infrastructure
Transport costs at a location are a function of the stock of fixed infrastructure,
T (`, t). An improvement in infrastructure (an increase in T (`, t)) may be an
innovation to an existing mode of transport (such as a better system of locks or a
different railway gauge) or else a new mode (such as the steam-powered railway).
Such improvements directly reduce the cost of transportation by equation (12),
but they also reduce the transport labour required for a given trade demand and
so can reduce tolls, by equation (16).
There are a number of problems in making an infrastructure improvement en-
dogenous. First, since the infrastructure stock is persistent, the infrastructure
investment decision may be a dynamic one. Second, investment must take place
over a connected interval of locations, since individual landowners are of mea-
sure zero. Third, the success of an infrastructure investment in one location may
depend on the presence (or absence) of an infrastructure investment in another
location.
We use the historical record of fixed infrastructure development in 18th and
19th century England and Wales, described in Section I.C, to motivate a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions that lend tractability to our model. First, we
distinguish between the upfront costs raised to cover the construction of an in-
frastructure improvement and the ongoing costs of maintenance and carriage.
Second, since we saw that infrastructure investment took place when joint-stock
companies, formed by Act of Parliament, raised finance locally, we incorporate
local finance in a simple way by dividing the interval of the economy into a num-
ber of ‘counties’. Finally, we incorporate ‘Parliamentary co-ordination’ as part of
our solution concept where equilibrium investments are not unique.
A. Infrastructure investment
Let L ⊂ [0, 1] be a connected interval of locations with measure m(L) > 0. An
infrastructure investment over interval L at time t permanently increases T (`, t)
for all ` ∈ L by an amount δ(t) > 0 at a cost xT · m(L), where xT > 0 is a
constant.20
A group of connected landowners along such an interval is thus required for
an infrastructure improvement. Since individual landowners are of measure zero,
the potential for free-riding means that equilibrium investment in infrastructure
tion to the one-dimensional interval. Compared to the North, there is a larger total quantity of secondary
labour employed at the latitude of the Midlands (as can be seen in larger total population in Figure ??).
When we use unadjusted data and invert the model to obtain productivities, this would be interpreted as
a higher productivity of the secondary sector there. When we transform the data as described in Section
III.A, the Midlands has less labour in the secondary sector and thus has lower productivity.
20The infrastructure gain δ(t) grows over time as transport technologies improve. Bogart (2014)
calculates that TFP growth in the transport sector was around 2 percent over the period of study. As
such, we let δ(t) = (1.02)tδ(0) where δ(0) is an initial level of transport technology. That the cost xT
is fixed means that we abstract from any interdependence in the cost of projecting infrastructure at
different locations; see Swisher (2015).
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is zero. We suppose that an ‘infrastructure company’ can be established at cost
c > 0. An infrastructure company can lease land from a group of landowners for
one period21 and then collects rent from firms using the leased land to produce
agricultural and manufactured goods. In return for the lease, the infrastructure
company pays a dividend to landowners and invests in infrastructure.
Infrastructure companies are competitive in the sense that any landowner in an
interval can propose to form a company by offering a prospectus which defines
rents to be collected from firms, the infrastructure investment and the dividend
payment. Landowners select that prospectus which offers the highest dividend.
We simplify the spatial nature of infrastructure investment by supposing that
an infrastructure company can be formed only at the level of a ‘county’. A county
is one of N ∈ Z+ connected intervals of equal measure that span the complete
unit interval of locations in the economy. In particular, county i ∈ [1, . . . , N ] is
the connected interval ∆(i) =
[
i−1
N ,
i
N
]
. The cost to improving infrastructure in
a county is thus xT /N . Only if the company leases all land in the county can the
infrastructure improvement take place.
The optimization problem of an infrastructure company in county i at time t
is to maximize its profit, piI(`, t),
(22) max
RF ,D,I
piI(i, t) =
∫
`∈∆(i)
RF (`, t)d`−D(i, t)− I(i, t)
[
xT
N
+ c
]
,
where RF (`, t) is the rent collected from a firm at location `, conditional on
infrastructure investment, D(i, t) is the dividend paid to landowners and I(i, t) is
an indicator function equal to 1 if there is an infrastructure investment in county
i at time t, and 0 otherwise.
We proceed as follows: First, we note that an infrastructure company’s problem
involves maximizing current period dividends only. Second, we show that if an
infrastructure investment increases total rent in a county (net of costs), then the
company can commit to building infrastructure. Finally, we establish the nature
of economy-wide (i.e., multi-county) equilibria and specify the selection criteria
in the case of multiple equilibria.
REMARK 1: If landowners in a county lease their land, it is to the company
whose prospectus offers the highest dividend. Since fixed infrastructure is per-
sistent, a company could in principle take account of a future higher stream of
rental income and pay a higher stream of future dividends. However, each lease
is for one period only and there is free access to the improved infrastructure in
21The restricted duration of the land lease is clearly a simplification of reality. However, the historical
evidence discussed above supports the idea that initial capital was raised primarily for construction costs;
we are here compressing the raising of funds and construction of infrastructure into one year in the model.
Moreover, as we shall see, despite restricting the investment decision to a one-period problem, the scale
of total infrastructure investment in the model is quantitatively close to that found on aggregate in the
data.
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subsequent periods. The bidding to form a company in period t + 1 is the same
for all potential companies. With free entry, landowners thus bid to form an
infrastructure company by maximizing D(i, t) only.
LEMMA 4: Maximizing current dividends means that infrastructure companies
make zero net profit, and that individual firms pay the maximum land rent con-
ditional on infrastructure investment. An infrastructure investment is optimal
for the infrastructure company when it increases total current rent, net of costs,
within a county.
PROOF:
The prospectus that maximises the dividend to the landowners forms the in-
frastructure company which leases the land. Since there is free entry to offering a
prospectus, companies make zero profit in equilibrium and the dividend paid to
landowners in a county i is,
(23) D(i, t) =
∫
`∈∆(i)
RF (`, t)d`− I(i, t)
[
xT
N
+ c
]
.
The dividend paid by the infrastructure company is determined by the rent
collected from firms and the choice over infrastructure investment. Suppose that
a prospectus in county i proposes a total dividend D1(i, t) based on RF1 (`, t) rents
paid by firms. If higher rent RF2 (`, t) could be collected by a company then,
by equation (23), D2(i, t) > D1(i, t). Landowners choose the prospectus that
delivers the highest dividend, so land is allocated by the infrastructure company
to the firms that can pay the highest rent at each location. The problem for
producer-firms is thus identical to that in Section II.
Let RˆF (i, t) be the maximum sum of firm rents collected by a company that
selects I(i, t) = 1 and R˜F (i, t) be the rents if I(i, t) = 0. If R˜F (i, t) > RˆF (i, t)−
xT
N − c then, by equation (23), dividends are maximised where infrastructure
investment does not take place. For the infrastructure company to be able to
commit to an infrastructure investment, it must be that it increases total current
rent net of costs within the county.
Such an infrastructure company does not always exist in each county in each
period, but can exist where the increase in the rents paid by firms is sufficient to
amortize the fixed costs of infrastructure.
Finally, the profitability of an infrastructure investment in one county can de-
pend on the presence (or absence) of investment in another county. We focus on
pure-strategy Nash equilibria where each county’s binary infrastructure invest-
ment is an optimal response to each other county’s investments. We first define
equilibrium infrastructure investment. Let each county’s investment decision be
si ≡ I(i, t) ∈ {0, 1}, where we drop the time subscript for notational convenience.
The payoff to each county, ui(si|s−i), is the net rent collected from firms, con-
ditional on the strategies s−i of other counties. The following defines a Nash
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equilibrium in this context and specifies the selection criteria in the case where
we have multiple, or no, such equilibria.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium in infrastructure investment is a strategy profile
s∗ such that for each i and all si ∈ {0, 1}, ui(s∗i |s∗−i) ≥ ui(si|s∗−i). Where s∗ is
not unique, Parliamentary co-ordination exists to select that profile s∗∗ ∈ s∗ which
maximises total net rent in the economy. Where s∗ is empty, Parliamentary co-
ordination imposes si = 0 for all i.
This equilibrium concept uses the historical evidence, described in Section I.C,
on the role of Parliament to motivate the reconciliation of alternative proposals
where there are multiple Nash equilibria. Since we do not allow for mixed strate-
gies, it may be that a Nash equilibrium will not exist. In this case, we impose that
no investment takes place in any county. Appendix B details the computation
of equilibrium. Calculating the Nash equilibria can be computationally intensive
since individual county investments must be calculated in all permutations of
other county investments. That is, for an interval split into N counties, there are
up to N · 2N−1 simulations to run for each period of each simulation. We select
N = 10 in the quantitative analysis below and limit the number of simulations
to 20 instead of the previous 100.22
V. Quantitative analysis
We use the model as extended in Section IV to capture three aspects of the spa-
tial takeoff of England and Wales during the 18th and 19th centuries in addition
to those macroeconomic and spatial changes matched in Section III. Specifically:
The overall decline in transport costs, the timing of the transport revolution, and,
the spatial distribution of the investments in infrastructure.
A. Interval representation of the transport revolution
We first map data on the spatial distribution of transport infrastructure into
the one-dimensional interval of the model. We consider the three major modes of
inland transportation (road, waterway and rail) over the period 1710-1881. We
use the turnpike network at 1830 and waterways (navigable rivers and canals) at
1670 and 1817 and a dynamic GIS of the railway network over the period from
1830. To map the two-dimensional information into a one-dimensional interval
we sum mileage along the East-West axis and adjust for width, as with the trans-
formation of employment. To interpolate turnpikes and waterways at decadal
intervals over the period we use information on road and canal acts per county
for the period 1701 to 1830 (Jackman, 1962; Appendix 13).
22While there are optimizations that reduce the number of repeated simulations required, even with
N = 10 the full model with endogenous infrastructure takes between seven and eight hours on a server
with 32 cores.
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In order to combine the three modes into one map of infrastructure develop-
ment, we weight each mode to form a combined picture of the spatial infrastruc-
ture development. Compared to a turnpike, a canal project would have been
more directly useful in haulage (see Bagwell, 1974; Turnbull, 1987; Bogart, 2014).
Though measures of the volume of goods traded by road are not available (see
Bagwell, p.58), Bogart (2014) suggests a horse-drawn wagon may carry as much
as seven tons by 1800; a horse-drawn barge could be loaded with ten times that
much. We thus weight a canal mile as equivalent to ten turnpike miles. Railways,
like canals, can handle heavy loads and, with the introduction of steam power,
do so at much greater speeds than horse-drawn barges. We can thus weight rail-
ways against canals based on their relative speeds. Bogart (2014) puts the speed
of transporting passengers on 18th-century stagecoaches at around one eighth
of 19th century trains. Our focus is on the transport of output (i.e., freight),
for which the relative advantage of rail may be smaller. Taylor (1951) presents
evidence for early 19th-century U.S. that puts the speed of transporting freight
on roads and canals at around one fifth that on rail (2 vs. 10-12 m.p.h). Our
measure of combined transport development thus weights a canal mile as having
ten times the contribution of a turnpike mile and a railway mile as having five
times the contribution of a canal mile.
Figure 16 presents the combined spatial infrastructure data mapped into twenty
five equally-sized counties. Some improvements occur in the 18th century in a
somewhat disjointed fashion, separately around 52.8◦ and 54◦ (that is, in the
Midlands and in the North). A merging into a more connected infrastructure
network begins later into the 19th century with the arrival of the railway which,
by 1850, represents the historically significant change in supply of fixed infras-
tructure. While this period has more infrastructure in all locations (except the
most Southern county), clear in the Figure is the persistent concentration in in-
frastructure improvement around London (51.4◦), the Midlands (52.8◦) and the
North (54◦). This one-dimensional representation of a patchwork development
mirrors that discussed in the literature (see Section I).
B. Parameterization
All baseline parameters remain as in Table 1. Again, we initialise the model
at 1710 with a distribution of infrastructure development that reflects the initial
distribution of access to transport. There are two additional parameters to pin-
down: The rate of growth of technology in the transport sector and the fixed
costs of investment in physical infrastructures. For technology growth, we use the
estimate in Bogart (2014) of approximately 2 percent per year. The fixed costs
of constructing transport infrastructure were significant, with large quantities
of skilled and unskilled labour required in addition to the materials, purchase
of land, legal fees and fees for agents to navigate the passage of required Acts
of Parliament. Such costs applied just as much to turnpikes as to canals and
railways (see Jackman (1962, p. 236) and Bagwell (1974, p.99). To parameterize
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Figure 16. Infrastructure level (data)
the fixed costs of infrastructure improvement we use data in Pollins (1952) on
nominal construction costs for early railways with data in Mitchell (1988) for
nominal GDP. The average railway construction cost is 0.39 percent of nominal
GDP. Using the baseline calibration, this equates to a per-county fixed cost of
xT /N = 1.15.
C. Simulation output
We run the full simulation with endogenous infrastructure 20 times and present
results with a confidence interval as before. The year of takeoff is on average
1789, four years later than the baseline without endogenous infrastructure. The
fit against macroeconomic variables remains close to the data, as can be seen
in Figure 17. Figure 18 shows that the pattern of aggregate structural trans-
formation in the model is now improved. As output and trade increase, so do
the gains from investing in infrastructures that save on tertiary labour. Without
endogenous infrastructure investments, the model predicts too much growth in
the relative importance of the tertiary sector and too little decline in the pri-
mary sector. Where infrastructure investment can be improved, the structural
transformation from the primary towards the tertiary sector is more modest.
We report in online appendix figures 4–9 the fit of the spatial distribution of
the level of employment in each sector, as well as the shares. There is some im-
provement in the fit of the tertiary shares in the model. The most interesting
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Figure 17. Macroeconomic Variables
Note: Average of 20 simulations ± 2s.d.
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Figure 18. Labour shares
Note: Average of 20 simulations ± 2s.d.
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additional component of the simulation output concerns the timing and intensity
of the endogenous infrastructure development. Figure 19 depicts the infrastruc-
ture level in the model as it occurs over space and time in the 10 counties of the
model.
Figure 19. Infrastructure level
Note: Average of 20 simulations ± 2s.d.
As can be seen in Figure 19, the model generates infrastructure development
that is consistent with the data in many respects. The acceleration in the supply of
infrastructure begins early in some locations and accelerates around 1850 across a
broad geography. The disjointed nature of infrastructure development seen in the
data is also replicated in the model, in particular capturing the industrial hotspot
around 53.8◦. The omission of the infrastructure investment around 52.5◦ is a
result of the model not capturing the (relatively small) secondary concentration
that emerges there.
One stark difference is the model prediction for significant infrastructure in-
vestment close to 50◦. This points to a limitation of the mapping into the one-
dimensional interval – in the model, the county close to 50◦ is directly adjacent to
London; in reality, that portion of England (which is South Devon and Cornwall)
is, as clear in Figure 6, actually very distant from it. The model thus predicts sig-
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nificant opportunities to gain from infrastructure in that location which in reality
do not exist. An additional aspect which does not quit fit is the breadth of the
improvements seen after at the end of the time period. We use the data in Bog-
art (2014) on TFP growth in transport to parameterize the model. This steady
increase in technology is most likely not accurate; the later arrival of steam and
railway technologies would have accelerated the attractiveness of improvements
in infrastructure into the 18th century.
The model predicts an average decline in total transport costs over the simula-
tion period of 19.3 percent which is significantly less than that found in the data
(86 percent). When we weight the transport costs decline by trade volume (that
is, the how much actual output and trade is lost to transport costs), the decline
is 50.0 percent. If we imposed an acceleration in the growth rate of infrastructure
technology discussed above, the decline in transport costs by the end of the sam-
ple period would be greater. Moreover, when we add the costs of trans-shipment,
as in Alvarez-Palau (2018), the real decline in freight costs will be lower than 86
percent.
The fit of the model to the location and timing of the spatial takeoff is improved,
since now the infrastructure investment around the Northern hotspot means that
the extent of tertiary labour growth seen in Figure 14 is no longer as far away
from the data.
Finally, since the model imposes that infrastructure investments take account
of only a one-period gain, we may be concerned that the model significantly
under-predicts total investment. We can compare the aggregate spend on infras-
tructure with that in the data. As Bogart (2014) summarizes, turnpike and canal
investment was around £27 million by 1820, which is 7.3 percent of 1820 nom-
inal GDP (based on the output estimates in Broadberry et al., 2015). Railway
investment by 1870 totalled £232 million, which is 22.6 percent of 1870 GDP.
In the model, total spend over the whole period on infrastructure is on average
5.5 percent of 1870 output. That is, the model captures the scale of the early
investments in infrastructure, but not the later improvements. As with the lower
simulated decline in transport costs, this can be partly explained by the constant
growth in transport TFP that we take from Bogart (2014); the model neglects an
unmeasured acceleration of transportation technology improvements in the nine-
teenth century. In addition, the spatial unit for infrastructure improvement, the
‘county’, is fixed over time in the model. As a result, we also miss the growing
geographical scale of the projects and the increasing levels of finance required to
fund them. As the geographical scale of individual infrastructure improvements
grew, the problems of co-ordination and free-riding increased, the local financ-
ing model became strained and so a greater role for the public sector emerged.
We would thus expect the model to somewhat under-predict the level of later
investments.
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D. Counterfactual infrastructure policies
As described in Section I, the development of transport infrastructure in Eng-
land and Wales during the industrial revolution was largely driven by private and
local finance in the context of a laissez faire regulator. The model of endogenous
infrastructure development introduced above captures aspects of that history. Al-
ternative policy treatments of infrastructure development exist, however, both in
history (as noted in France) and in modern infrastructure development. We use
our model to ask in this Section whether counterfactual infrastructure plans may
have brought forward or delayed the advent of the industrial takeoff.
Specifically, we consider counterfactuals that modify the timing and spatial
distribution of the infrastructural development generated endogenously by the
model. Our baseline is the average outturn of endogenous infrastructure devel-
opment depicted in Figure 19. Table 3 reports statistics based on 100 runs of the
baseline and each counterfactual. We report the year and latitude of takeoff (that
is, the year and latitude in which manufacturing firms first begin to innovate),
the number of years until 1.5 percent growth, the initial average transport cost
and the initial labour share in the transport sector.
Table 3—Infrastructure Baseline and Counterfactuals
takeoff takeoff years initial initial
year latitude to 1.5 percent av. κ LT percent
Baseline 1782.7 53.7◦ 57.3 0.20 8.00
1. Early (50) 1777.6 53.7◦ 53.7 0.17 7.40
2. Early (100) 1769.2 53.7◦ 59.8 0.13 6.25
3. Late (50) 1782.5 53.7◦ 59.5 0.20 8.00
4. Late (100) 1782.0 53.7◦ 57.0 0.20 8.00
5. Uniform baseline 1783.8 53.7◦ 62.2 0.20 8.00
6. Uniform early (50) 1787.3 53.7◦ – 0.17 7.49
Note: Average of 100 simulations ± 2s.d.
The first counterfactuals bring forward the baseline infrastructure development
by 50 and 100 years (counterfactuals 1 and 2, respectively). In the previous coun-
terfactual exercises in Section III.D, we found that exogenous variations in the
transport cost were inversely related with the year of takeoff. This was consistent
with Proposition 3 in DR-H, which found that higher transport costs raise produc-
tivity. In the counterfactuals here, we find that earlier infrastructure development
accelerates takeoff. Where infrastructure development is brought forward by 50
years, takeoff occurs five years earlier; where development occurs 100 years early,
takeoff is accelerated by over thirteen years. In each case, bringing forward the
infrastructure development means that transport costs are on average lower at
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the initial date. As the previous counterfactuals showed, this would tend to delay
the takeoff since it can reduce agglomeration incentives and set back the date at
which manufacturing firms are large enough to meet the fixed costs of innovation.
However, since transport labour is here endogenous to the level of infrastruc-
ture supply, bringing forward the advances in infrastructure also releases labour
into manufacturing and agriculture, making firms larger and bringing forward the
point at which manufacturing firms can amortize the fixed costs of innovation.
This suggests a tension between the role of infrastructure in hastening takeoff by
reducing the labour required in transport, and its impact on delaying takeoff by
reducing transport costs. Based on the spatial pattern of infrastructure develop-
ment in Figure 19, it is clear that the gain from the lower labour in transport
dominates the loss from the lower transport costs.
Counterfactuals 3 and 4 delay the infrastructure rollout by 50 and 100 years,
respectively. Given the timing of endogenous development depicted in Figure 19,
this delay is equivalent to there being no infrastructure development at all prior to
takeoff (i.e., equivalent to the baseline in Section III.C). The initial transport cost
and initial labour share are unchanged and the takeoff date is not significantly
different from the baseline.
One finding that is consistent with the previous counterfactuals is the lack of
any impact on the location of takeoff. The high initial productivity in the North of
England, together with the already low energy costs there, make it the location
of takeoff in all counterfactuals. We showed in Section III.E that substantial
changes in energy prices can result in a shift of the location of the first innovation
by manufacturing firms to London. This occurs after energy prices fall there by
over 56 percent. Given the locations of coal fields, only a significant, nationally-
interconnected improvement to inland transportation would generate this decline.
Coastal shipping along the Eastern coast of England did emerge to transport
coal from Newcastle to London (Davis, 1962), but it did so at slow speeds and
high costs (the high initial coal price difference between Newcastle and London
is reflects the coastal shipping technology at 1710). The large costs of building
infrastructure meant that such a national project did not emerge endogenously
and the industrial hotspot proceeded in the North.
None of the counterfactuals thus far consider the role of the spatial heterogene-
ity of the infrastructure improvements. We explore this by taking take the same
total growth in the level of infrastructure, but apply it broadly rather than locally
within a county. In particular, we use the same initial distribution of transport
costs and introduce the endogenous improvements in Figure 19 in a uniform way
by averaging each period’s total infrastructure investment across all locations.
Counterfactual 5 shows that making the endogenous improvements uniform does
not affect the timing of development. Since the initial distribution of transport
costs and initial labour used in transportation is unchanged by making the later
development of infrastructure uniform, and since that later infrastructure devel-
opment is partly a result of that takeoff, then spreading out the infrastructure
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development without changing its timing has no clear impact on the year of the
takeoff.
What does make a difference is to bring forward the uniformly distributed in-
frastructure improvements. Counterfactuals 1 and 2 showed that bringing forward
the spatially-heterogeneous improvements in infrastructure can substantially ac-
celerate the timing of the industrial takeoff. In those cases, the impact of lower
labour in transport dominated the effect of the decline in agglomeration forces.
Counterfactual 6 introduces infrastructure development in a uniform way but
brought forward by 50 years. This is similar to counterfactual 4 in Table 2, where
lower transport costs delayed takeoff. As can be seen in Table 3, bringing forward
uniform development of infrastructure by 50 years means a takeoff over four years
later than the baseline. The pace of acceleration in growth is also substantially
slower, not reaching 1.5 percent on average in the period simulated (up to 1881).
These outcomes are clearly different to bringing forward the infrastructure de-
velopment with the pattern defined by Figure 19, as Table 3 shows. The initial
average transport costs and the initial share of labour in transportation are each
lower than the baseline, as in counterfactuals 1 and 2, but the spatial distribution
of those changes are different.
The spatial distribution of the infrastructure gains thus clearly matters to
whether the acceleration induced by lower transport labour dominates the de-
lay caused by lower transport costs. Where the infrastructure improvements
are localized, those particular areas benefit the most in terms of lower transport
labour demand while the cost of transportation outwith those areas remains high.
Where the better infrastructure is uniformly distributed, in contrast, transport
costs are lowered in all locations and this has the effect of significantly muting
the gains from releasing labour out of the provision of transportation services.
This set of counterfactual results suggest that only policies targeted at localized
infrastructure improvements may generate significant returns in terms of inducing
earlier innovation. Bringing forward localized infrastructure development can sig-
nificantly accelerate the date of takeoff. Bringing forward uniform improvements
does nothing to accelerate, and may delay, the onset of innovation despite costing
the same in terms of infrastructure improvements. The problem for such a lo-
calized policy is identifying those areas where infrastructure should be improved,
potentially before the greatly increased demand for transportation services even
emerges. The one clear implication is that the gains from a controlled, uniform
improvement to infrastructure most likely do not outweigh their high costs.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of endogenous infrastructure development in the
context of a spatial growth framework and initialized it to England and Wales in
1710. The model can explain aspects of the evolution of the economy over the
subsequent 171 years. In particular, we capture the structural transformation
across three sectors, the acceleration in growth and the changing spatial distri-
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bution of activity in agriculture, industry and transportation. Where the early
infrastructure investments were made at a local level, the model captures the
magnitude of total investment. As the scale of individual infrastructure projects
grew toward the end of the period, the model under-predicts total investment.
Finally, we have seen how changes in the timing and spatial distribution of in-
frastructural development can have an effect on the timing of the acceleration in
growth that accompanies industrialization.
We leave a number of extensions to be considered in future work. First, the
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) data shows that there was specialization within indus-
trial subsectors as well as between agriculture and industry. A model of multiple
secondary subsectors that each specialize spatially may improve the fit of the
model. Second, one aspect of the private evolution of infrastructure during the
industrial revolution in England and Wales is that it grew in scale over time. A
model that captures the expanding scale of finance and growing scope of infras-
tructure may better explain the timing of the infrastructure development seen in
the data. Related to that is the changing industrial organization of infrastructure
companies, from small local concerns to national private companies to eventual
public ownership. Third, by the late 20th century much of the railway network
was considered to be inefficiently organized and in over-supply. In the 1960s, the
government implemented dramatic reductions in station numbers and mileage.
The long-run consequence of the laissez faire regulation of the early infrastruc-
ture development has yet to be understood. Fourth, for tractability, infrastructure
investments were assumed to take place within one period. Incorporating a more
realistic endogenous investment that can spread the fixed costs over multiple pe-
riods may be important. Finally, while we have shown that there is a role for
policy in accelerating development, we have not addressed the question of how
an infrastructure policy that is optimal for growth could be designed.
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A two-region model
The model in the main text incorporates a continuum of locations which can
then be directly connected to (a one-dimensional transformation of) the real
world. However, it is reasonable to explore whether such an approach yields
gains in terms of the ability to capture the dynamics of the industrial revolution
over a simpler model with fewer points in space. If a simple two-region (e.g.,
north-south) model can replicate patterns of trade, aggregate labour shares, the
location of innovation, the impact of transport costs and the implications for
policy, then the continuum version is not a parsimonious one.
We present here a simplified version of the model in the main text wherein
there are two regions, r = {S,N}. We think of these two regions as collapsing
the southern and northern halves of the continuum of locations, such that the
distance between region S and region N is 12 . In order to present some initial
observations, we give results from a first period of the model calibrated to data
for 1710. We also model transport costs as exogenous. We thus drop the time
subscript and ignore transport labor.
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Preferences. — Consumers face the same optimization problem as detailed in
Section II.A. Preferences are non-homothetic, agents consume where they work
and labour is mobile, meaning that, in equilibrium, utility is equal across regions.
Production. — Land supply at each region is normalized to one. In the model
with a continuum of land, we restrict each location to only one sector, but since
there are many such locations a sector may on aggregate increase or decrease its
overall land use. There can be three versions of a two-region model. We could
assume that each region can be occupied by only one sector. With only two
regions, such a restriction would result in complete and persistent specialization
of each region which is not something we observe in reality. Alternatively, if
multiple sectors can occupy the same region they may do so either with fixed
land supply per sector per region or with competition for land between sectors
within a region. As such, we permit multiple sectors to operate in each single
region, sharing the land. In particular,
A(r ) = ZA(r )LA(r )αGA(r )(1−α)(A1)
M(r ) = ZM (r )LM (r )µGM (r )(1−µ),(A2)
where now Gi(r ) is a sector i firm’s choice of land in region ` at time t. In the
version of the model with fixed land supply, we set Gi(r ) = 12 for each i and all r .
We assume there is no diffusion of technology between regions.23 Firm profits
are thus,
(A3) pi(r )ZiLˆi(r )ıGi(r )(1−ı) − w(r )Lˆi(r )−Ri(r )Gˆi(r ),
where Gˆi(r ) is optimal choice of land.
Trade. — We set κ to be exogenous and, since there are only two regions, we do
not use a region index. We ignore labor employed in transport.
Equilibrium. — As previously, landowners maximise rental income. As such, all
land is used so in equilibrium GA(r ) + GM (r ) = 1 for all r and, since different
firms can now share a region, this implies RM (r ) = RA(r ) = R(r ). The first order
conditions, along with these equilibrium conditions, yield regional land prices.
Equilibrium in land then requires
∑
r∈{S,N}R(r ) = R¯, where R¯ is the aggregate
land rent.
23The absence of diffusion approximates the diffusion parameter chosen in the continuum model. With
δ = 15, only 0.06 percent of an innovation realised at the midpoint of the south arrives at the midpoint
of the north (e−δ∗
1
2 ).
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Equilibrium in goods trade implies that the excess supply by a good in one
region is, net of transport costs, equal to excess demand of that good in the other
region. In particular,
xi(S)− ci(S)[LM (S) + LA(S)]− κ |xi(S)− ci(S) [LM (S) + LA(S)]|
+xi(N)− ci(N)[LM () + LA(N) = 0.(A4)
Finally, equilibrium in the labour market requires that
∑
`
∑
i Li(r ) = L¯.
Calibration. — Initially retained baseline parameters are as in Table 1. Again,
we can use the data to invert the model to obtain average initial production
technologies, as in the continuum model. As before, we use occupational data
that is normalized by the average width of each region (since the north is thinner
than the south) We treat continuum-model locations ` = [1, 250] as region r = S,
and locations ` = [251, 500] as region r = N . The sum of employment in each
sector over those locations thus determines initial productivity in each region. We
also use the same initial guesses for u¯, pM and R¯.
Simulation. — A first observation can be based on comparative advantage.
When we calibrate using data aggregated to two regions, there is only a slight
comparative advantage to the south in manufacturing; ZM (S)ZM (N) = 1.22 and
ZA(S)
ZA(N)
=
1.20. While the south initially has a large, spatially-concentrated secondary sector
in London, its agriculture is, as described in Allen (2004), also more productive
than the north. In a simulation of the model with the transport cost used in the
continuum model, there are no net gains from trading between the regions.
Second, we can compare simulation outcomes when we consider a transport
cost which does yield trade in equilibrium. As a baseline, when transport costs
are zero the excess supply of manufacturing in the south is only 2 percent of
southern manufacturing output. When we set transport costs to be κ = 0.1 (one
third of that in the original parameterization), we obtain the results in Table
A1. Regardless of whether land is fixed or chosen optimally, the initial aggregate
labour share in agriculture is lower than that in both the data and the continuum
model. This is a consequence of neglecting the spatial concentration of highly-
productive manufacturing. With productivity averaged over large regions, the
land required to satisfy demand for manufactured goods crowds-out that available
for agriculture and, by consequence, labour demanded by agriculture is lower.
Third, the existence of productive secondary locations that are also spatially
concentrated matters for the location of an industrial takeoff. The location of
innovative manufacturing is a product of, among other factors, the relative local
productivity in manufacturing and the relative local cost of energy. A produc-
tivity disadvantage in some locations of the north relative to the south may, as
we see in reality, not limit innovation if energy costs are also sufficiently low
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Table A1—Initial labor shares (exc. tertiary)
Data Continuum
2-region 2-region
(lower κ) (lower κ)
(endog. G) (fixed G)
LA(1710)/L¯ (percent) 51.6 50.6 43.9 44.9
LM (1710)/L¯ (percent) 48.4 49.4 56.1 55.1
there, relative to the south. In the calibration of the continuum model, the peak
southern manufacturing location is 2.39 times as productive as the peak northern
manufacturing location. Despite that productivity difference, innovation begins
in the north since energy costs six times more in the south. Based on a two-region
calibration, southern manufacturing is, as noted, initially 1.22 times as productive
as northern manufacturing. This suggests that the energy price differences in a
two-region model could be far lower and still yield a northern industrial revolution
– that is, the importance of very cheap energy in the north is only clear in the
continuum model. Moreover, the existence of a few northern locations that are
relatively more productive than northern locations on average is crucial. As we
saw in the counterfactuals in Section III.D, other locations in the north are not
sufficiently productive, relative to the south, to take advantage of lower energy
costs.
To summarize, a two-region model does not have trade in equilibrium with
the original transport cost, misses aggregate labour shares by a wider margin
and cannot explain a role for energy prices. Moreover, these comparisons with
the continuum model are against two-region representations of the data. A two-
region model cannot, for example, capture a different impact on growth of a
spatially-disaggregated infrastructure policy. We can conclude that there is, in
this instance, merit in treating space as a continuum of locations.
Computation of Nash equilibria in Section IV
Section IV presents a version of the model in which county-level investment
in infrastructure depends on the investment decisions of other counties. At the
beginning of each period, the model runs through the following algorithm24 to
compute the infrastructure equilibrium:
1) Where N is the number of counties, set P to be a 2N−1×N array containing
an empty column 1 and all binary permutations for I(i) in columns 2 : N .
2) Calculate optimal strategy for County 1:
24Full MATLAB code is available online or direct from the author.
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a) For each permutation in P , calculate T (`, t) and κ¯(`, t) for ` in counties
2 : N .
b) Run full model both with County 1 investing and not investing for
each permutation in P .
c) Calculate gain to County 1 of investment under each permutation in
P .
d) Add County 1 investment decisions to the array of permutations P .
3) Calculate optimal strategy for County 2:
a) P contains County 1 decisions given permutations over 2 : N , including
the optimal response to the County 2 investment decision.
b) Run full model both with County 2 investing and not investing for
each permutation in P .
c) Calculate gain to County 2 of investment under each permutation in
P .
d) For each permutation, check that the County 2 decision is consistent
with the County 1 decision.25 Add consistent County 2 investment
decisions to the array of permutations P and collapse P to unique
remaining permutations.
4) Repeat Step 3 for counties 3 : N , checking at each part (d) that the County
decision is consistent with strategies in previous counties.
5) After calculating optimal strategy for County N , consider the investment
permutations left in P ,
a) If P is empty, set I(i) = 0 for all i and pass to the full model.
b) If P contains more than one permutation, select that row in P which
maximises
∫
`R(`, t)dt and pass to full model.
c) If P contains one permutation, pass to the full model.
25Suppose that N = 3 and that at step 2 County 1 invests only if both County 2 and County 3 invest.
At step 3, it may be profitable for County 2 to invest in all permutations of County 1 and 3. However,
the investment by County 2 when County 3 invests and County 1 does not is not consistent with County
1’s decision to invest.
